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Abstract 
 Humanitarian aid logistics is an emerging field that applies principles of supply chain 
management and logistics to the humanitarian relief sector. This thesis explores humanitarian aid 
logistics strategies in the context of the 2015 Refugee Crisis. An unprecedented number of refugees 
sought asylum in Europe beginning in 2015, where European officials and humanitarian 
organizations were largely unprepared to provide for them. The 2015 Refugee Crisis offers a 
unique perspective on humanitarian aid logistics because it requires both short-term and long-term 
response strategies. Through the framework of management science, a subfield of supply chain 
management, and logistics, this thesis creates a model that addresses the lack of adequate shelter 
sites and capacity for refugees in Greece. This is still a relevant problem today as a number of 
refugees still reside there, and the model adjusts for fluctuating capacity and conditions of the 
shelters. Long-term issues are discussed as the effects of the Crisis continue. Through analysis of 
short-term and long-term relief strategies, this thesis provides a foundational understanding of 
humanitarian aid logistics in crises that involve a complex network of stakeholders and 
unpredictable timelines. It is also useful for discussions about future implications of humanitarian 
aid logistics and other crises occurring in other parts of the world.  
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Executive Summary 
 This thesis explores the emerging field of humanitarian aid logistics and discusses 
applications of supply chain management and management science strategies and tools to the 2015 
Refugee Crisis in Europe. Humanitarian aid logistics can be defined as the process of planning, 
implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods, materials and 
equipment as well as related information, from point of origin to point of consumption for the 
purpose of meeting the end beneficiaries’ requirements. Within humanitarian relief, crises are 
unpredictable and lives are at stake. Therefore, the logistics of humanitarian relief organizations 
are complex as they must respond quickly and effectively to any given crisis occurring around the 
world.  
 I chose to analyze the 2015 Refugee Crisis because there are multiple stakeholders involved 
in managing the crisis, from governments, to relief organizations, to suppliers, to the refugees 
themselves. The effects from 2015 are still ongoing, and countries like Greece are struggling to 
host the high number of refugees entering its borders. The impact of the EU-Turkey Deal from 
2016 affected the ability of refugees to continue migrating to other European countries, effectively 
trapping them in Greece while they await to be relocated. This presented a unique dilemma in that 
Greece had to find capacity to host thousands of refugees in its various shelters.  
 In order to address the lack of capacity among Greece’s shelters, this paper presents a linear 
programming model which seeks to optimize the number of refugees across shelter locations. Data 
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was obtained to utilize 
realistic numbers of refugees and capacity levels at each shelter. While the data reflects a short 
time window, and refugee movements fluctuated on a daily basis, the model serves as a basis for 
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short-term decision-making and the numbers can be adjusted as needed. By minimizing the amount 
of travel time between shelters, an optimal solution could be found. 
 Beyond short-term strategies, this paper discusses the use of weighted criteria and a 
preference matrix that considers the quality of the shelters. Many refugees spend years living in 
these shelters, some of which are considered to be substandard and inhumane. The use of a 
preference matrix prioritizes quality of shelters as a long-term strategy. There is also a discussion 
of the tradeoffs between effectiveness and efficiency; minimizing travel time and the optimal 
number of refugees between shelters and the quality of shelters. The long-term strategies that are 
discussed involve shelter innovation, integrating refugees into urban housing, and the use of a 
centralized logistics information system that would facilitate faster communication between 
stakeholders.  
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Humanitarian Aid Logistics 
Introduction 
In the commercial world, supply chain management is at the core of a company’s 
operations. Supply chain management focuses on the optimization of activities involving sourcing, 
procurement, logistics, and the coordination between channel partners including suppliers, 
intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers. Logistics is one part of the supply 
chain that entails the planning, implementation, and control of forward and reverse flow of goods, 
services, and information between the point of origin and the point of consumption. By optimizing 
their supply chains, companies can maximize output while remaining cost efficient. Outside of the 
commercial world, though, supply chain management is also a critical component of non-profit 
organizations, states, and non-governmental organizations. Efficiency is made more difficult in 
the face of uncertainties regarding demand, availability, timeliness, costs, and many other real-
world factors. This paper will examine the application of supply chain principles to the realm of 
humanitarian relief and disaster response strategies through analysis of humanitarian logistics in 
relation to the 2015 Refugee Crisis. 
 Humanitarian logistics is the process of planning, implementing and controlling the 
efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods, materials and equipment as well as related 
information, from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of meeting the end 
beneficiaries’ requirements (Blecken). Outside of standard functions, humanitarian supply chains 
also include aspects of donor-relationship management, resource assessment, supplier 
management and monitoring and evaluating the effect of aid that has been delivered (Dubey and 
Gunasekaran). Humanitarian supply chains are considered to be possibly the most complex type 
of supply chain and are often described as a response to unforeseeable and unplanned events that 
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range from small localized natural disasters through to catastrophic events affecting large regions 
and populations (Hughes, K.) Prior to the mid-2000s, the field of humanitarian logistics received 
little attention. However, humanitarian organizations are increasingly realizing the importance of 
supply chain management and logistics (Vojvodic et al). Organizations are prioritizing their 
logistics function, as it impacts the entirety of their operations and in many cases the outcome of 
saving lives and reducing suffering. 80% of all disaster relief efforts revolve around logistics 
(Dubey and Gunasekaran). 
Humanitarian operations range from short-term humanitarian relief in response to acute 
emergencies to medium and long-term assistance focusing on recovery and reconstruction in post-
emergency contexts (Blecken). In the first ten days of a humanitarian crisis, immediate concerns 
center around saving lives and providing basic necessities. This is known as a “bed for the night 
strategy”, which is considered the classical approach to humanitarian relief (Barnett and Snyder). 
In this strategy, aid agencies should limit themselves to the impartial, independent, and neutral 
provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters. Impartiality requires that assistance 
be based on need and not on the basis of nationality, race, religion, gender, or political opinion. 
Neutrality demands that humanitarian organizations refrain from taking part in hostilities or from 
any action that either benefits or disadvantages the parties to the conflict. Independence demands 
that assistance should not be connected to any of the parties directly involved in armed conflicts 
or who have a stake in the outcome. This is especially critical for aid agencies who rely on 
government funding, especially if the donors have a stake in the outcome (Weiss and Barnett). 
After the initial stages of a crisis, humanitarian organizations focus their attention on short-
term priorities. Some examples of short-term priorities include food security and preventing the 
outbreak of disease among vulnerable populations by providing access to clean water and 
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sanitation. Once the situation has become more stabilized, organizations look at medium and long-
term priorities. They must ensure a constant supply of necessities, adequate housing, and health 
services. Long-term priorities are mainly concerned with sustainability, education, and 
development. 
 For most companies, optimizing their supply chain is usually aimed at maximizing profits. 
This often entails implementing the most cost-efficient measure while meeting quality or other 
performance goals. For humanitarian organizations, the focus is shifted to maximize the number 
of people who can be helped with the available funds. Due to the nature of urgency and quick 
response time, low cost is not always achievable. There is a tradeoff between time sensitivity and 
achieving low-cost solutions. Efficient supply chains can be implemented usually where demand 
is more certain. At the start of any crisis, speed overrides cost as a priority. The first 72 hours are 
crucial. At this stage goods may be flown in from abroad as quickly as possible despite being an 
expensive option. Later on, typically after the first 90 to 100 days, it becomes a mixture between 
being effective in helping people and doing this at a reasonable cost (Van Wassenhove, L. N.).  
 One of the most difficult aspects of humanitarian supply chains is what is known as the last 
mile effort. This describes the challenges surrounding the last leg of the supply chain, in getting 
critical supplies to the end user. Delays can arise due to unpredictable and rare disruptions and/or 
a lack of flexibility to respond to changes quickly. These can be attributed to abnormal risks, such 
as natural disasters, financial crises, terrorism, or disruption to a supplier’s facility. Delays can 
also occur in the supply chain due to various reasons including compromised quality of the 
supplied goods, difficult border crossings, and in many cases, inadequate infrastructure (Jahre). 
  The greatest challenges faced by actors working in the field of humanitarian logistics are 
operating conditions, such as infrastructure, uncertainty in supply and demand, timeliness, high 
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staff turnover, and the many stakeholders involved. These stakeholders include humanitarian 
organizations, governments, militaries, media, donors, and victims of the disaster. Van 
Wassenhove notes that, “At any one time, there can be as many as several hundred humanitarian 
organizations at the scene of a disaster, not always acting in a coordinated fashion.” This highlights 
the need for collaboration not just among humanitarian organizations, but all stakeholders at 
various levels. Coordination and collaboration efforts with partners in the supply chain occurs both 
horizontally and vertically (Blecken, Alexander). This can be visualized by Chart 1 below: 
Chart 1 - Stakeholders in the humanitarian aid supply network 
 
(Source: Kovaks and Spens) 
 
When disaster strikes, the governments of host, neighboring and other countries within the 
international community are the catalysts of the humanitarian logistics stream since they have the 
power to authorize operations and mobilize resources. Host government authorization is 
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fundamental for the involvement of other countries. Without this, no other actor except national 
aid agencies and the military can operate (Dubey and Gunasekaran).  
Commercial supply chains and humanitarian supply chains differ in the incentives offered 
to improve performance. Companies in the private sector are regulated by the supply and demand 
of the market, and are motivated to invest in continuous improvement by their bottom line and 
profit. Organizations in the humanitarian sector lack the incentive to learn from previous disasters 
and invest in continuous improvement. These organizations do not measure profit or see a rise in 
their stock price. Their “reward” is to minimize the amount of lives lost and suffering due to 
conflict and disasters; thus, the outcomes have much higher stakes than those faced by companies 
in the private sector (Van Wassenhove, L. N.). 
Logistics Strategies 
  The logistics involved in commercial supply chains can either be reactive or proactive, 
and depending on the organization, both. The logistics involved in commercial supply chains are 
guided by quality, cost, time, and risk. Humanitarian logistics on the other hand are mainly reactive 
and consist of three stages: preparedness, response, and collaboration (Dubey and Gunasekaran). 
Logistics in the private sector usually deals with a predetermined set of suppliers, manufacturing 
sites, and a stable or at least predictable demand, all of which are unknown in humanitarian 
logistics (Cassidy, W.B.). Like companies in the private sector, humanitarian organizations can 
gear their supply chains to be more effective and efficient by adopting three concepts: agility, 
adaptability, and alignment. In the private sector, agility corresponds to the responsiveness, 
efficiency, and flexibility of the supply chain. In humanitarian relief, agility translates to rapid 
deployment on demand. Adaptability emphasizes the need for dynamic supply chains, which 
corresponds to the creation of alliances and partnerships across suppliers. For example, UNHCR 
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and other humanitarian organizations secure supply in advance by forming partnerships with 
suppliers in different locations around the globe, typically by region. When or if a crisis arises, 
they can depend on this network of suppliers in the region closest to where the crisis is occurring. 
By establishing a large network of suppliers, humanitarian organizations can depend on getting 
the supply they need in the right place at the right time. Alignment focuses on reducing the 
differential interests of multiple parties, such as risk and resource planning among humanitarian 
organizations (Van Wassenhove, L. N.). 
There are various supply chain strategies that can be applied to humanitarian logistics. 
Supply uncertainty and product uncertainty lead to different situations. Depending on the crisis at 
hand, humanitarian organizations will follow one of four strategies outlined in the strategy matrix 
(Chart 2). When both demand and supply uncertainty are low, an efficient supply chain design is 
the best fit. However, when demand uncertainty is high but supply uncertainty is low, then 
responsive supply chain design is regarded to be a best fit. This would entail contracting for 
additional supplies in the event they are needed. In the case when supply uncertainty is high but 
demand uncertainty is low, then a risk hedging strategy is the best fit. For example, organizations 
can work with a supplier to set aside amount of supply for an agreed cost ahead of time to reduce 
uncertainty. However, when both demand and supply uncertainty are high, then an agile supply 
chain strategy is the best fit. Agile involves responsiveness and flexibility as organizations respond 
to demand as it happens (Dubey and Gunasekaran). 
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Chart 2 - Supply chain strategy matrix 
 
(Source: Dubey and Gunasekaran) 
 
 In the planning stage, one key decision that organizations must make is between 
postponement vs. speculation. A postponement strategy utilizes product or process design concepts 
such as standardization, commonality, modular design, and operations reversal to delay the point 
of differentiation in products, services, movement and other value-adding activities. Postponement 
activities in the field of humanitarian logistics most often take the form of prepositioning semi-
finished goods, centralizing stock, and setting aside non-earmarked funding and goods. 
Postponement is more likely to be employed during the earlier stages of a crisis, when demand is 
uncertain or fluctuating. By delaying differentiation, there is less waste and organizations can wait 
to make more informed decisions. Speculation, on the other hand, allows forward placement of 
inventory, forward buying and early commitment to the form of a product. A speculation strategy 
is geared towards situations where demand can be more easily predicted. For instance, a 
speculation strategy would be useful for medium to long-term planning in a humanitarian crisis, 
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such as supplying vaccines to an established refugee camp or providing food to victims of natural 
disasters. These are instances where demand is stable and predictable as the event or crisis has 
already happened.  
 Flexibility is crucial in humanitarian logistics. Organizations work with a complex network 
of suppliers to ensure that needs are met in any crisis. A flexible supply base strategy involves 
multiple sourcing options, thus allowing for alternatives should one source be disrupted. One way 
of doing this is to develop a supply alliance network with suppliers in various countries. A flexible 
supply base can also include decentralized decisions which enable local adaptations. Related to 
this strategy is the concept of flexible transportation. A flexible supply chain will include multi-
modality (plane, truck, rail, ocean carrier, pipeline, etc.), multiple carriers and/or multiple routes.  
According to Jahre, strategic stock strategy is among one of the most commonly reported 
strategies that humanitarian organizations employ. Strategic stock strategy utilizes inventories at 
certain “strategic” locations (warehouses, logistics hubs, distribution centres) that can be deployed 
quickly in case of a disaster.  UNHCR is one of the most prominent organizations in the field of 
humanitarian logistics that follows a strategic stock strategy. UNHCR operates in 123 countries 
with more than 9,300 staff working to provide protection and assistance to more than 46 million 
refugees, returnees, internally displaced, and stateless people. The organization’s Supply 
Management System (SMS) has a network of seven distribution centers throughout the world 
located in Copenhagen, Jordan, Dubai, Nairobi, Tanzania, Cameroon, and Ghana. UNHCR can 
ship core relief items from these stockpiles to assist up to 600,000 people within 72 hours, if needed 
(Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme). While strategic stock allows for 
flexibility and shorter lead times, it can also be expensive and risky. However, by pairing strategic 
stock strategy with others such as flexible supply base and postponement, some of these risks can 
14 
 
be mitigated. The combination of these strategies is shown to improve the speed, cost, and quality 
of an organization’s response (Jahre). 
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The 2015 Refugee Crisis 
Background 
 In 2015, the number of people applying for asylum in the EU peaked at 1.26 million (“EU 
Migrant Crisis”). Of these, Greece alone received 850,000. Only 292,540 cases were approved for 
asylum in that year out of the 1.26 million overall. Germany and Sweden accepted the highest 
number of asylum seekers, with Germany accepting over 140,000 applicants and Sweden 
accepting over 32,000 (“Migrant Crisis”). The International Organization for Migration estimated 
that over one million traveled to Europe by sea. Between 2015 and 2016, an estimated 8,793 
refugees died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. By 2016, the total number of asylum 
applications in the EU reached 2.5 million people.  
Figure 1 - Asylum Applications in the EU 
 
(Source: “Asylum Statistics”) 
 
The top three countries that refugees were fleeing from included Syria, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. Syrians accounted for the largest number of applicants in 14 of the 28 EU Member States 
(“Asylum Statistics”). The demographics of asylum seekers are outlined in Figure 2. Across the 
EU as a whole, almost half of asylum seekers were aged 18-34. One third were minors under the 
age of 18, some of whom were unaccompanied. In certain countries, the proportion of younger 
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asylum seekers under the age of 18 was as high as 44 percent. These higher proportions were 
reported in Hungary, Austria, Germany and Poland (“Asylum Statistics”). 
Figure 2 - Age Distribution of Asylum Applicants 
 
(Source: “Asylum Statistics”) 
 
Refugees vs. Asylum Seekers 
Individuals traveling to Europe in 2015 and 2016 consisted of economic migrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers. There are different definitions and legal implications for each group 
depending on their status and reasons for migrating to Europe. This section will attempt to define 
these differences and eligibility for remaining within Europe. An economic migrant is a person 
who leaves his or her country of origin purely for financial and/or economic reasons. They are 
choosing to leave in pursuit of a better life; not because they are fleeing persecution and have no 
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choice but to leave. “Economic migrants do not fall within the criteria for refugee status and are 
therefore not entitled to benefit from international protection as refugees” (UNHCR 2006). 
According to the international convention and protocol on the status of refugees the 
definition of a refugee pertains to any individual who has:  
“a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it” (UN General Assembly). 
 Before refugee status is granted, vulnerable individuals fleeing persecution are referred to as 
asylum seekers. An asylum seeker is the term given to a person who has applied for refugee status 
and has not yet received a final decision on his or her claim (UN General Assembly). Without 
refugee status, they are offered less legal protection and do not have the same rights under 
international law. In Greece, asylum seekers make up the majority of people who are living in 
reception centers and shelter sites as they wait for their case to be processed. Sadly, not every 
asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee. However, an asylum-seeker should not 
be sent back to his or her country of origin until the asylum claim has been examined in a fair 
procedure.  
 Refugees are protected under the 1951 Geneva Convention, known as the Convention 
relating to the status of refugees. One key principle outlined in the convention is non-refoulement, 
which is binding on all states. Under non-refoulement, “No Contracting State shall expel or return 
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(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion” (UN General Assembly). This would include refusal 
of entry at the border as well as removal from within the territory. The principle of non-refoulement 
applies wherever a state exercises its authority, including beyond its borders, for example when 
intercepting ships on the high seas (UN General Assembly). For these reasons, the EU cannot turn 
away refugees and asylum seekers. 
EU Asylum System 
EU member states have a shared responsibility to welcome asylum seekers. The Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) sets out to establish common asylum policy throughout the EU 
(“Common European Asylum System”). The creation of a common procedure across all EU 
countries aims to increase speed and efficiency while promoting fairness in decision-making. In 
addition to a common procedure, CEAS promotes solidarity and cooperation to alleviate pressure 
on any one member state. Cases should be examined in a uniform standard across member states 
to ensure asylum seekers are granted similar outcome no matter the country they apply in. In the 
2015 Refugee Crisis, this was not the case as Italy and Greece’s reception and processing 
capabilities were overwhelmed. Under CEAS, the Reception Conditions Directive aims to 
harmonize reception standards across the EU. “It ensures that applicants have access to housing, 
food, clothing, health care, education for minors and access to employment under certain 
conditions” (“Reception Conditions”). However, the Reception Conditions Directive leaves 
discretion to individual member states. They are able to determine what constitutes adequate living 
standards for refugees and how it should be undertaken, which creates variability in the process 
depending on the member state. 
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 In the EU, the Dublin System regulates which country processes asylum applications. 
Under the Dublin Convention first enforced in 1997, the country of first arrival is typically the one 
to take responsibility for examining and processing asylum applications. One example of an 
exception to the Dublin Convention is family reunions, in which case the country of first arrival 
would not take on this responsibility. The Dublin Convention was replaced by Dublin II in 2003 
which set out hierarchical criteria to determine which state is responsible for processing the 
application. Dublin III comes into force in 2013, which further defines rights of asylum seekers 
and allows appeal of decisions (Cellini). The 2015 refugee crisis highlighted the Dublin System’s 
limitations and failures. Countries like Greece and Italy that were disproportionately receiving 
refugees did not have the capacity or resources available to process the vast amount of applications 
being filed. A lack of political unity and cooperation among EU member states has also led to 
increasing difficulty in enforcing the shared asylum policy. For example, non-EU members that 
participate in the Dublin System can opt out of some of the minimum standards set forth by the 
EU (Bank and Milner). 
Relocation vs. Resettlement 
Once refugee status has been approved, refugees can wait months or years to be relocated 
within Greece or to a different EU country. Relocation, “is the transfer of persons who are in need 
of or already benefit from a form of international protection in one EU member state to another 
EU member state where they would be granted similar protection” (“Resettlement and Relocation” 
n.d.). Relocation is an applicable option for asylum seekers and refugees currently residing in 
Greece. As of September 2017, only 19,244 people have been relocated from Greece and 8,451 
from Italy (“Relocation and Resettlement” 2017). Relocation is often used interchangeably with 
resettlement, but they are very different. Resettlement, “is the transfer of non-EU national or 
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stateless persons who have been identified as in need of international protection to an EU state 
where they are admitted either on humanitarian grounds or with the status of refugee” 
(“Resettlement and Relocation” n.d.). Resettlement applies to recognized refugees living outside 
of the EU. Most resettlement cases have taken refugees from Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon (“Tenth 
Report on Relocation and Resettlement”). The EU budget supports Member States with €6,000 - 
€10,000 per resettled refugee (“Relocation and Resettlement” 2017). 
EU-Turkey Deal 
On March 18, 2016, the EU and Turkey released a joint statement known as the EU-Turkey 
Deal. The goal of the EU-Turkey Agreement was set out, “to replace disorganized, chaotic, 
irregular and dangerous migratory flows by organized, safe, and legal pathways to Europe for those 
entitled to international protection in line with EU and international law (“EU-Turkey Statement”). 
A secondary goal of the agreement was to further deepen EU-Turkey relations (Borges). This 
agreement outlined nine key actions that would foster bilateral cooperation between the two actors 
to combat major issues of the 2015 refugee crisis. The first action point states that all new irregular 
migrants entering the EU through the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey beginning on 
March 20, 2016. At that time, the number of migrants entering Greece from Turkey had already 
significantly decreased from the peak months of 2015. After the EU-Turkey was put into place, 
there was an uptick in the number of refugees attempting dangerous routes, including through 
Libya and the Mediterranean Sea (Rygiel et al).  
The second action point states that for every irregular migrant returned to Turkey, another 
Syrian refugee will be resettled from Turkey to the EU. Other action points address Turkey’s role 
to prevent new sea and land routes from Turkey to the EU, the creation of a Voluntary 
Humanitarian Admission Scheme, acceleration towards visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, six 
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billion euros in funding and aid to be used on Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, upgrading the 
Customs Union, re-opening negotiations on the Turkey’s accession to the EU, and a joint effort to 
improve humanitarian conditions in Syria (“EU-Turkey Statement”).  
Some Syrian asylum-seekers have been forcibly returned to Turkey without having access 
to asylum and without being able to appeal against their return, in breach of international law. 
Others have ‘voluntarily’ returned to Turkey because of the misery on the Greek islands. In 
Turkey, Syrian refugees receive temporary protection, but are left to fend for themselves. Greek 
asylum appeals authorities have consistently ruled that Turkey is not a safe country. The response 
to the EU-Turkey Deal was a widespread criticism from various international parties. In response 
to the EU-Turkey Deal, Elisabeth Ingres, the head of Medecins San Frontieres's (MSF) mission in 
Greece stated that the general sentiment is that, “they would not allow their assistance to be 
instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation and refuse to take part in a system that has no 
regard for the humanitarian or protection needs of asylum seekers and migrants” (Borges). 
Conditions in Greece 
A report from UNHCR in the November of 2015 noted conditions in Greece in particular 
were not sufficient. Many Greek reception centers lacked adequate shelter, sanitation, and site 
management. Furthermore, refugees were left without access to accommodation, healthcare or 
education. The quality and scope of services offered varied significantly by site and location 
(“Greece”). “The Council of Europe has deemed refugee facilities in the camps to be substandard 
and able to provide no more than the most basic needs such as food, hygiene, products and blankets 
while Save the Children has described the conditions in some of the new camps as inhumane” 
(“Service Delivery in the Refugee Camps of Greece”). Lesvos, one of the main reception centers 
located near Turkey, received 3,300 people on average per day in November 2015. The center only 
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had a total capacity for 2,800. UNHCR provided transportation from the northern shores to other 
sites in eastern Greece through eight buses and three minivans on a 24/7 basis. From the beginning 
of the Refugee Crisis to the end of 2015, UNHCR increased its staff from 54 to 216 in Greece 
(“Greece”).  
Since the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, Greek authorities have initiated a 
policy to automatically detain those who arrive by sea. The closure of the border between North 
Macedonia and Greece, commonly referred to as the Balkan route, left thousands of refugees and 
migrants stranded in Greece. Out of all EU member states, Greece is arguably the least equipped 
to host refugees and asylum-seekers. The country is still recovering from the economic crisis and 
unemployment is one of the highest in the EU. Austerity measures led to major cuts in public 
spending, and the state is behind in addressing long-term responses for hosting refugees (“Service 
Delivery in the Refugee Camps of Greece”). Asylum seekers await their case to be processed in 
Greece for months on end, unable to leave, and living conditions are poor and they are subject to 
violence. Current estimates place this number at 60,000 people (“EU Policies Put Refugees at 
Risk”). Many of the asylum seekers arrive that arrive in Greece are already in a vulnerable state. 
However, even those who turn up at Greek reception sites in good condition soon find themselves 
suffering from health problems. A single doctor per shift provides medical care to the entire camp 
population and often only the most urgent cases get seen. Doctors at the local hospital are also 
overwhelmed (Yaxley). 
 In 2018, the number of arrivals to the Greek islands stood at 23,000 (Kingsley). New 
arrivals stay at camps like Moria, a designated hotspot, until their case is settled. It can take as long 
as two years before asylum seekers are given their decision (Kingsley). Conditions in Moria are 
dire. The camp currently hosts around 9,000 people in a space designed for just 3,100. The 
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overcrowding is so extreme that asylum seekers spend as much as 12 hours a day waiting in line 
for food that is sometimes moldy. There are about 80 people for each shower and around 70 per 
toilet (Kingsley). Some aid workers have complained about raw sewage leaking into tents where 
children are living. Reports of sexual assaults, knife attacks and suicide attempts are common 
(Kingsley). Mental health is a rising concern, as asylum seekers are subjected substandard living 
conditions for long periods of time. “The conditions [at Moria] have fueled accusations that the 
camp has been left to fester in order to deter migration and that European Union funds provided to 
help Greece deal with asylum seekers are being misused” (Kingsley). As of September 2018, an 
investigation by the EU anti-fraud agency into Greece had been announced.  
Recently, conditions at the Vathy reception and identification center on the island Samos 
has been worsening. As of November 2018, the center is currently hosting around 4,000 people, 
which is six times more than its intended capacity. It was designed to host no more than 650 people 
(Yaxley). Supplies are short, and new arrivals must resort to buy flimsy tents from local stores. 
The tents that they pitch are located on a steep slope in adjacent fields to the center, offering little 
protection from the cold weather, without electricity, running water or toilets (Yaxley). UNHCR 
has reported that there are snakes in the area and rats that are thriving in the uncollected waste. 
The centers on the Greek islands of Lesvos and Samos represent the worst of the sites in 
Greece. Others, such as Skaramagas, are leading examples of what sites should be. Skaramagas is 
one of the largest camps in mainland Greece, hosting 3,200 people. It is also considered one of the 
highest quality camps. Refugees have been able to establish small businesses and community 
groups. Some of the “luxuries” at the camp include refrigerators, convection ovens, and plumbing. 
The camp also has a common area with a community center, a playground, and offices for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (Alesevich). 
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Short-Term Strategies 
Linear Programming Model 
There are an infinite amount of short-term and long-term considerations and complex 
decisions that must be made in relation to the refugee crisis. One example of a short-term problem 
is the lack of shelter available in Greece for refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in 2015 and 
2016. On any given day, many refugee centers and shelters were at maximum capacity and often 
exceeded their capacities in order to accommodate as many people as possible. In some cases, 
capacity levels soared upwards of 200 percent, as seen in Table 1. This strain on resources made 
it increasingly difficult for organizations like UNHCR to provide adequate care for refugees, many 
of whom are women and children. Unsurprisingly, the shelters that most often exceeded capacity 
could be found on the eastern islands of Greece which bordered Turkey. During 2015 and early 
2016, the route that most refugees took to eventually reach Europe was through Turkey. In other 
cases, refugees made treacherous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe. Both 
routes led to the massive amount of people overcrowding shelters in Greece.  
Table 1 shows an array of shelters in Greece and the current capacity and occupancy level 
for each. Those shelters at or below 100 percent capacity are highlighted green and are not under 
consideration for this problem. Shelters highlighted in yellow fall between 100 and 120 percent 
capacity, and shelters in orange are above 120 percent capacity. The problem will focus on the 
eight shelters exceeding 120 percent capacity. Table 1 also shows the physical number of spots 
available at shelters, and negative numbers indicate the number of individuals over capacity. Since 
Greece was not a final destination for most refugees, these numbers did not remain constant. Many 
moved on to other European countries such as Germany after filing for asylum in Greece. 
Therefore, the data in Table 2 only represents a snapshot from May 13, 2016 (see Appendix, 
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Exhibit A). However, the data still represents an accurate measure and scale of the problem. 
Optimizing shelter capacity seeks to minimize suffering and poor conditions for refugees. While 
this paper solely focuses on an optimal solution based on the number of refugees present in Greece 
on May 13, 2016, the model serves as a flexible baseline. Data could be updated continuously as 
numbers fluctuate over time, leading to new optimal solutions.  
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Table 1 - Capacity Levels of Refugee Sites in Greece 
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The objective of this short-term problem is to minimize the total amount of travel time 
between shelters. In setting this objective, the hope is to transport refugees as quickly and 
effectively to the nearest shelter that has the ability to take them. It is not always the case that 
shelters with leftover capacity will necessarily be the closest. In this case, Greece poses a complex 
problem because many of the refugees seeking temporary shelter there are concentrated in southern 
and eastern regions. It would then make sense that shelters with the most leftover capacity would 
be located in the northern and western regions of the country. 
In order to find an optimal solution for the lack of shelters in Greece in May of 2016, 
management science principles and a linear programming model can be used. Management science 
is the application of the scientific method to managerial decision-making. Linear programming is 
a mathematical tool a mathematical technique for maximizing or minimizing a linear function of 
several variables, based off of linear algebra and optimization theory within calculus. The solution 
will be found using a type of “what-if analysis” found in Microsoft Excel’s Solver tool. It is a 
common type of model utilized to solve management science problems. A linear programming 
model consists of various inputs, including decision variables, an objective function, and model 
constraints.  
Table 2 is a template of all of the inputs that will be entered in the solver tool. It displays 
the time it takes to travel, in minutes, between shelters. Those shelters labeled A-H are currently 
exceeding their maximum capacity. Demand represents the number of refugees that would have 
to be transported elsewhere to lower capacity level to 100 percent. The shelters labeled 1-22 are 
currently under capacity. Supply represents the number of empty spots remaining, or the number 
of refugees that they could accept without exceeding their maximum capacity.  The cells that are 
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highlighted show the shortest amount of time between shelters exceeding capacity and the next 
closest shelter.  
Table 2 - Travel Time in Minutes Between Origin and Destination Sites 
 
 
 
The decision variables, objective function, and model constraints can be found in Table 3. 
The decision variable representing the number of refugees traveling between shelters is denoted 
as “Xij”, where “i” represents the shelter under capacity and “j” represents the shelter over capacity. 
For example, the first decision variable is X1A, where “1” represents the location Malakasa, and 
“A” represents the shelter at Agios Andrea. The value we set for Xij represents the number of 
refugees we plan to move between these points. Within the objective function shown in Table 3, 
the goal is to minimize the total travel time and so, for example, the number of people moved from 
site 1 to A (X1A) is multiplied by 47, the amount of time in minutes between these two locations as 
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noted in Table 2. Because there are 176 decision variables representing the various combinations 
between shelter sites, the display of the objective function is shortened. 
Table 3 - Objective Function and Constraints 
 
 
After determining the decision variables and the objective function, constraints were added 
to the problem. There are three major considerations for the constraints. First, the number of 
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refugees being sent from the original shelter to the receiving shelter could not exceed the capacity 
of the receiving shelter. Therefore, the sum of the refugees sent from all shelters labeled A-H 
cannot exceed the supply at a shelter 1, Malakasa. Since Malakasa can take up to 189 refugees, the 
constraint limits the amount of refugees to be received up to 189. This does not mean that Malakasa 
will take all 189 if there are other shelters that would minimize the total time traveled. The second 
constraint category addresses demand, or the number of refugees being sent from overcrowded 
shelters. The demand is set exactly equal to the number of refugees that are considered over the 
maximum capacity of a shelter.The last constraint ensures that all decision variables are non-
negative numbers, since the number of people traveling between shelters cannot be negative. 
Table 4 shows the optimal solution calculated by solver. The far right column lists the 
number of refugees received at each shelter compared to the available supply. Due to the tight 
margin, most shelters took in the maximum number of refugees that they had capacity for. Only 3 
of the 22 destination shelters were not filled to maximum capacity. These sites are Doliana, 
Katsika, and Tsepelovo, which are the westernmost locations and the farthest from the ports of 
entry for most refugees. On the horizontal axis, the number of refugees sent from each shelter 
exactly matches demand. With the constraints and parameters of this problem, solver found that 
the minimum total time traveled between shelters amounts to 1,755,746 minutes or 29,262 hours. 
Even though most of the shelters are full, this problem is optimizing the way people are transported 
in a time efficient manner. In this problem, refugees are not simply reshuffled to random shelters 
throughout Greece. Without setting an objective to minimize travel time, the maximum total travel 
time could amount to 4,398,853 minutes, which is roughly 2.5 times more than the optimal 
solution. This would place a strain on resources and refugees could be traveling the farthest 
possible distances between shelters, which is not efficient. 
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Table 4 - Excel Solver: Optimal Solution 
 
 
 
Table 5 on page 34 shows the sensitivity report for the linear programming problem. The 
table lists each of the constraints for all shelters, both sending and receiving refugees. The final 
value column displays the actual number of refugees either sent or received to that particular site 
according to the most optimal solution. Sensitivity reports determine the effect on optimal 
solutions of changes in the objective function coefficient (travel time) and the right-hand side 
constraint (capacity). In this table, the sensitivity range is measuring the right-hand side constraint, 
demonstrated by the allowable increase and decrease columns. The sensitivity range for the right-
hand side constraint is the range over which the current optimal solution will remain optimal. One 
very insightful piece of information from the sensitivity analysis report is the shadow price; the 
marginal value of one additional unit of resource in relation to the right-hand side constraint 
sensitivity range. 
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The first eight rows of the sensitivity report (cells $C$25 through $J$25) show the final 
value, shadow price, constraint, and allowable increase/decrease for shelters that are over capacity. 
Final values represent the number of refugees sent out of the shelter. The shadow price depicts the 
amount of time, in minutes, that would be added to the total time overall if one additional refugee 
is sent from that shelter. For example, the number of refugees sent from Agios Andreas is 71. If 
one more person is sent from Agios Andreas, making the final value equal to 72, then it will take 
an additional 264 minutes to reassign that extra person. Up to 25 additional refugees could be sent 
from Agios Andreas, however this would add 264 minutes per person.  
Cells $L$2 through $L$23 are the shelters receiving refugees. The final value represents 
the number of refugees assigned to that location. The shadow price depicts the amount of time, in 
minutes, that could be saved if the receiving shelter had more capacity. For example, Malakasa 
ended up receiving 189 refugees. If one additional refugee could be sent there, the total time 
calculated in the optimal solution would decrease by 220 minutes. 226 is the allowable increase 
indicated for Malakasa. Therefore, if capacity allowed for an additional 266 refugees to be sent to 
Malakasa, then total time would be reduced by 220 266 minutes per person. This would result in 
a total time savings of 58,520 minutes (220 minutes multiplied by 266 people) achieving a three 
percent reduction compared to the current optimal solution. If more than 266 additional refugees 
are sent there, it is unclear what the effect would have on the total travel time (i.e. travel time could 
increase exponentially). It is clear that Schisto has the highest shadow price in absolute value 
(which is -250). If more capacity could be added at Schisto, this would greatly improve the optimal 
solution. 
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Table 5 - Excel Solver: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Limitations 
 While this model offers a solution for short-term planning, there are some limitations 
involved. First, the model fails to take into account groups of refugees that must remain together 
such as families. This would have to be added as a constraint so that parents and children and even 
extended families are able to travel together. Similarly, some families may request to be sent to 
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shelter sites where their extended family have already been established. Another consideration is 
resource availability. While some shelters may have capacity, individuals with disabilities, single 
mothers and children traveling alone all require special care. Not every shelter offers the same 
resources and amenities. The model also fails to account for the sites that may be closed. These 
include Chios, Kos, Leros, Lesvos, and Samos which are all islands that border Turkey in the east 
(see map in Appendix). Many of the shelters on these islands are designated “hotspots” where they 
receive a majority of file claims for asylum. If these sites are closed to receiving additional 
refugees, whether they have additional capacity or not, this would be an additional constraint that 
would need to be added to the model. If these sites are closed, this would add significant travel 
time to other shelters.  
Organizations like UNHCR also have to consider their budget, and how much is designated 
not only to operations in Greece but also whether certain funds are earmarked for food and supplies 
as opposed to transportation or vehicle expenses. The travel time between each site would be cut 
down if air travel was feasible to accommodate thousands of refugees. However, this is not the 
case. As a result, distances and time were calculated with the time to travel by car and ferry. Some 
travel times are significantly shorter if routes are taken through Turkey as opposed to traveling by 
ferry from the islands to mainland Greece. However, potential issues could arise with crossing 
borders or for other objections that Turkey might raise. Lastly, this model does not set an upper 
limit on the amount of travel time. The longest travel time is 21 hours between Samos and Doliana.  
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Long-Term Strategies 
Preference Matrix 
 With these limitations in mind, there are numerous factors to be considered. While the 
linear programming model gives an output that minimizes the total time traveled between shelters, 
it fails to account for other factors that will affect long-term outcomes. In order to address these 
limitations and, a preference matrix can be used. In the corporate world, a preference matrix is 
often useful for supplier selection and distinguishing qualification by various criteria. Each 
individual criterion is ranked and weighted, and then weighed as a percentage of the total overall.  
 Table 6 below uses this same process in a preference matrix that weighs criteria for refugee 
shelters. These eight criteria were first ranked by importance from 1-8, with 1 being most 
important. Family was ranked first, indicating the high need for family members to remain together 
when being moved to a different shelter. The next most important factor was the living conditions 
of a given shelter. Locations such as Lesvos have received international attention after multiple 
organizations and news sources, reported the dire conditions refugees are being subjected to. At 
Lesvos, the site is so overcrowded that refugees are housed in flimsy tents that do not protect 
against harsh winter weather. Violent hate crimes and high rates of depression and suicide have 
been reported at Lesvos. Furthermore, sexual and gender-based violence remains a major issue, 
and women and children are not offered adequate protection (Gogou). The shelters that are over 
capacity are typically those where we see the worst living conditions and lack of sanitation. From 
there, availability of food, health services, and supplies such as clothing or blankets for the winter 
were ranked. The availability of staff, the cost of maintaining and running the shelter, and the 
distance and travel time between shelters were considered least important relative to other criteria. 
In determining the order of importance, emphasis was placed on long-term impacts and outcomes. 
While budget and costs dictate a lot of decisions, especially when budgets are earmarked for 
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particular purposes, it is ranked among the least important factors in comparison to the other 
criteria that pose more serious consequences. For example, a lack of food or access to clean water 
is simply not a possible sacrifice that can be made without resulting in a loss of life. Similarly, 
health services are critical for preventing the spread of disease among close living quarters within 
the refugee shelters. Refugees traveling from all regions of the world can easily spread or contract 
diseases, and sanitation is also a major concern. Again, the consequences of a lack of adequate 
health services is not an option without resulting in casualties. Other considerations include access 
to education and care for unaccompanied children. The camp located at Theben, 100 km away 
from Athens, is one such camp that offers accommodation and special care for unaccompanied 
children (Gabeau). 
Table 6 - Weighted Criteria 
 
 
 From these rankings, each criterion is given an individual weight on a scale from 1-5, with 
5 representing the most important criterion. Finally, the criteria are weighed as a percentage of the 
total, adding up to 100 percent. Once these have been determined, UNHCR can use a preference 
matrix to allocate refugees to other shelters accordingly. 
Table 7 shows a template for the preference matrix. All of the possible receiving shelters 
are listed in the left column, and these are measured by the criteria. The criteria would be rated on 
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a scale from 1-10 for each shelter, with 10 being the highest score. One thing to note is that it is 
possible for multiple shelters to receive the same score in the same criterion category (i.e. more 
than one shelter can receive a score of 10). It is also possible that none of the shelters in that 
particular criterion category will receive a score of 10. After the table is completed with the 
remaining scores, these are converted to a raw score, weighted score, and a final ranking. The 
receiving shelter with the highest rated score is the optimal choice since it reflects a balanced score 
between all of the qualifying criteria. In this way, a preference matrix is useful for decision-making 
in complex situations by evaluating criteria and weighing options effectively. 
 
Table 7 - Preference Matrix 
 
 
 Once the preference matrix is complete, organizations will have a more holistic view of the 
tradeoffs between various shelters. To take this a step further, a multivariable problem could be 
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applied to the previous short-term linear programming problem. Instead of maximizing or 
minimizing one objective function, there would be two objective functions to take into account. 
The original short-term problem would remain the same, where the objective function minimizes 
the total travel time between shelters. The second objective function would maximize the scores 
of the preference matrix, considering the quality of each receiving shelter. The new optimal 
solution of this multivariable model would find a “middle ground” between prioritizing shelters 
with the highest scores, reflecting the most important criteria, as well as minimizing travel time 
and remaining efficient. 
 The refugee re-assignment problem is just one example of where data analysis can be used 
to improve decision-making. Similar tools can help manage inventory allocation to certain areas, 
selection of locations for new camps or hospitals, assign resources, plan delivery routes, and many 
other important operational tasks in humanitarian relief. Considering uncertainties surrounding 
demand and the fluctuating conditions of a given crisis, data analysis and management science 
tools lead to faster solutions and better insight into decision-making.  
Other Long-Term Considerations 
 Recent developments have promoted closer partnerships between corporate and 
humanitarian groups. One case is the creation of Better Shelter, a flat pack refugee shelter designed 
by Swedish company Ikea and UNHCR. The shelter is made up of a steel frame, insulated 
polypropylene panels, and recycled plastic. It can last three years and accommodate up to five 
people (Tubertini). Traditional tents that house refugees rely on canvas, ropes, and poles. They are 
more prone to leak during heavy rains, provide little insulation during the winter, and can easily 
be uprooted in strong winds. The Better Shelter is solar-powered and offers four hours of electric 
light and the ability to charge mobile phones. Shelters can fit into two boxes and be fully assembled 
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in four hours without the use of tools. Although each unit comes at a cost of $1,250, Better Shelter 
lasts six times longer than a typical emergency tent (Wainwright). More importantly, the Better 
Shelter offers privacy, security, electricity and durability.  
 Beyond innovation, other measures to improve the living conditions of refugees stuck in 
Greece involve utilizing urban spaces. After the economic crisis, large cities in Greece are still 
recovering and lack infrastructural development. The housing and construction industries were 
severely affected, leaving many projects unfinished and some buildings vacant and unused. By 
expanding shelter sites into more urban areas, unused spaces will serve a new purpose. This would 
be sustainable and provide support for rehabilitation and reconversion projects in the area, 
stimulating the construction industry and the urban economy as a whole (Wain).  
The task of moving refugees to urban areas within Greece has already been initiated. Since 
July 2017, the Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation programme (ESTIA) was 
created to combat housing shortages for refugees in Greece. Under this program, UNHCR works 
with the Greek Government, local authorities and NGOs to provide urban accommodation and 
cash assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers in Greece (“Emergency Support to Integration & 
Accommodation”). ESTIA is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund of the 
European Union. Eight cities have already committed to the ESTIA program: Athens, 
Thessaloniki, Livadia, Trikala, Larissa, Karditsa, Crete and Nea Filadelfia (Edwards). Most 
refugees and asylum seekers are relocated to the Attica region and northern Greece. The total 
number of accommodation places created thus far has amounted to 26,186.  
Uncertainty over relocation and reunification in the EU, legal status, and a recovering 
economy in Greece are all obstacles to long-term planning. Outside of shelter capacity, UNHCR 
and Greek asylum officials should expedite the processing of asylum claims and resettlement 
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cases. For refugees who are refused relocation, reunification or asylum in Greece, and for those 
deciding to remain in Greece, a two-step transitional approach to accommodation may be more 
appropriate than long-term residency in a camp (“Service Delivery in the Refugee Camps of 
Greece”). It is recommended that alternative legal pathways are made available, such as 
humanitarian, student, and work visas and private sponsorships, for asylum seekers, migrants and 
refugees who are not eligible for resettlement or family reunification (“EU Policies Put Refugees 
at Risk”). 
 In order to facilitate faster communication and coordination between various humanitarian, 
government, and private sector stakeholders involved in Greece, it is recommended that a camp 
management information system is implemented (“Service Delivery in the Refugee Camps of 
Greece”). One central information system would create transparency among various stakeholders 
and track decisions and changes in real time. The linear programming model presented in this 
paper could also be integrated into this information system. The system is not only useful for 
tackling shelter capacity issues, but also organizing procurement activities, supplier information, 
and, logistics and delivery. This would allow for oversight of high-level needs and has potential to 
eliminate redundancies or shortfalls in the case where organizations are unaware of which supplies 
are needed at each site. 
 Outside of Greece, such systems are already in use. A team at Purdue University is working 
with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to create an Emergency Response E-Supply Chain 
Management System, “a web-based, multi-platform, centralized, offline-compatible electrical 
emergency response system” (Yih, Yuehwern et al). The system enables CRS to monitor stock 
levels in its various warehouses in real time, file emergency procurement requests instantly, and 
tracks relief materials from donors all the way to the end beneficiary. Prior to the development of 
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the Emergency Response E-Supply Chain Management System, CRS had a paper-based system 
that had a high potential for human error. The newer web-based system is reliable, efficient, and 
sustainable, which allows CRS to better anticipate delays, shortages, and bottlenecks within its 
supply chain. 
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Conclusion 
 By analyzing the field of humanitarian aid logistics in the context of the 2015 Refugee 
Crisis, it is clear that there are many complex decisions that must be made. The nature of any 
refugee crisis is very serious and the need to save lives and reduce suffering is the central focus of 
decision-making. While Greece continues to grapple with the issue of hosting refugees, it draws 
attention to the greater need for collaboration between governments, relief organizations, and 
private corporations. The number of refugees arriving on a daily basis on Greek islands has 
significantly decreased, but there are still new daily arrivals today. As civil conflicts arise and new 
refugee flows occur, Greece could receive an unprecedented number of new arrivals at any time. 
There is a pressing need for supply chain analysis and improvement in operations so that the 
country is better equipped to handle any future influx of migrants.  
By providing a linear programming model that optimizes shelter capacity at refugee 
centers, Greek officials and leading relief organizations can better manage their operations. It also 
serves as a step towards alleviating suffering among refugees in Greece. Shelter capacity is just 
one aspect of site operations. The consideration of food supply, staffing, medical equipment, and 
other resources could be added as additional constraints to a linear programming model. The use 
of a multi-variable model would be more realistic to consider a holistic view of the refugee 
situation in Greece. Organizations can aim to establish objective measurements of the quality of 
various sites in Greece in order to ensure both sufficient conditions and efficient optimization of 
capacity at any given site. This is an opportunity for future research and application for more 
complex models and supply chain optimization.  
As programs like ESTIA expand, there is less stress on occupancy rates and shelter 
capacity. However, this excludes hotspots and other sites with high receiving rates. As shelter 
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capacity improves, more funds can be allocated towards other issues faced by refugees in Greece 
such as health initiatives and access to education. Refugees that spend upwards of two years or 
more in temporary shelter sites should have access to these resources. There is also a need for 
reform in asylum policy within the European Union. Cooperation is needed not only within the 
EU but also with the international community as a whole. In the meantime, supply chain experts 
and relief organizations can look at issues such as the bottleneck created in processing asylum 
claims. Efforts to reduce processing times would be impactful for countries like Greece from long, 
drawn out processes that are inefficient. Not only would this result in cost savings, but it would 
also shorten the amount of time that refugees need to spend living in temporary shelters. 
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